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%	share		 %	Change		 Seats		 	 Change			
of	vote			 from	2010	 won	 	 in	seats	
	
Liberal/National	 45.5	 	 +1.8	 	 90	 	 +17	
Labor	Party		 	 33.4		 	 –4.5		 	 55	 	 –17	 	
The	Greens		 	 		8.6		 	 –3.1	 	 		1	 	 +		0	 	
















%	share		 %	Change		 Seats		 Net	Change			 New	Senate	
of	vote			 from	2010	 won	 in	seats		 (from	July	2014)
	 	 	 	
Liberal/National	 37.7	 	 -0.8	 	 17	 –1	 	 33	
Labor	Party		 	 30.2		 	 -5.0		 	 12	 –6	 	 25	
The	Greens		 	 		8.6		 	 -4.5	 	 		4	 +1	 	 10	
Others	 	 	 23.6	 	 +10.5	 	 		7	 +6	 	 		8	
	
	
The	Greens	
	
Measured	by	seats,	if	not	votes,	the	Greens	held	their	ground.	Deputy	Leader	
Adam	Bandt	retained	the	seat	of	Melbourne,	increasing	his	vote.	The	Greens	
gained	a	Senate	seat	in	Victoria,	to	give	them	an	unprecedented	11	members	of	
the	federal	parliament.		
	
Nevertheless,	this	election	marked	the	first	serious	check	in	the	Greens’	rising	
share	of	the	national	vote.	However,	the	gap	between	the	party’s	performance	in	
the	Senate	and	the	House,	which	widened	markedly	in	2010,	disappeared	in	
2013.	This	suggests	that	the	Greens’	8.6%	may	represent	the	party’s	new	core	
level	of	support.		Indeed,	it	is	possible	that	the	number	of	Greens	‘identifiers’	in	
2013	was	actually	greater	than	the	5.9%	who	identified	with	the	party	in	2010	
(Miragliotta	2013:	712).	Certainly,	the	demographics	of	the	Greens	vote	are	
encouraging:	pre-election	opinion	polls	showed	a	linear	decline	in	the	Greens	
share	of	vote	with	age,	the	youngest	voters	being	more	than	twice	as	likely	as	
those	over	65	to	prefer	the	Greens.	All	else	being	equal,	generational	turnover	
promises	a	steady	increase	in	the	Greens	vote.	
	
So,	if	the	core	of	Greens	identifiers	remained	solid	or	perhaps	increased,	why	did	
the	Greens	lose	so	many	votes?	Some	blamed	the	change	of	leadership	from	the	
‘avuncular’	Bob	Brown	to	the	sometimes	‘shrill’	Christine	Milne.	Some	blamed	
the	Greens	for	the	Gillard	government’s	introduction	of	the	‘carbon	tax’.1		In	fact,	
in	a	highly	polarised	election	in	which	the	personalities	of	Abbott	and	Rudd	
loomed	larger	than	any	discussion	of	policies,	the	Greens	were	largely	ignored.	
																																																								
1	As	Crowley	(2013,	p.	379)	put	it,	‘minority	government	politics	created	the	
window	of	opportunity’	to	introduce	carbon	pricing’.	
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Early	in	the	campaign,	when	Rudd	and	Abbott	seemed	determined	to	prove	that	
each	could	be	tougher	than	the	other	in	dealing	with	the	boatloads	of	refugees	
arriving	in	Australia’s	territorial	waters,	it	appeared	that	the	Greens	might	
benefit	from	the	disgust	of	voters	who	saw	the	major	parties’	policies	as	
inhumane.	But	the	Greens	did	not	have	a	monopoly	of	humanity	toward	
refugees;	it	was	also	an	issue	for	Palmer.	More	importantly,	with	both	Rudd	and	
Abbott	promising	to	stop	the	boats,	the	issue	slipped	from	the	headlines.	Some	
former	Greens	voters	deserted	the	party	because	they	believed	it	was	
prioritising	asylum-seekers	over	environmental	concerns,	especially	by	agreeing	
to	exchange	preferences	with	Palmer’s	party.	
		
In	previous	elections	many	voters	chose	between	major	party	candidates	for	the	
House	but	voted	Greens	in	the	Senate.	Faced	with	fading	poll	figures,	Milne	made	
a	last	minute	appeal	to	voters	to	vote	Greens	to	deny	an	Abbott	government	
unfettered	scope	to	pass	radical	legislation.	But	in	2013	the	abundance	of	
alternatives	meant	that	the	Greens	faced	much	stiffer	competition	for	the	protest	
vote.	Nor	was	a	party	that	for	most	of	the	parliament	had	been	formally	
committed	to	sustaining	an	unpopular	government	a	plausible	destination	for	a	
protest	vote.	With	the	two	issues	on	which	the	Greens	had	the	strongest	profile	–	
asylum	seekers	and	climate	change	–	ranking	low	among	voters’	concerns2,	the	
Greens	were	marginalised,	especially	when	the	Liberals,	who	in	2010	
preferenced	the	Greens	ahead	of	Labor,	in	2013	deliberately	put	the	Greens	last	
in	the	hope	of	eliminating	them	from	the	electoral	landscape.	
	
Where	do	the	Greens	go	from	here?	Although	their	Senate	vote	was	down	by	a	
third	compared	with	2010,	it	was	only	marginally	below	the	party’s	2007	result.	
Remarkably,	both	nationally	and	in	the	five	most	populous	states,	the	Greens’	
share	of	the	House	vote	in	2013	was	actually	greater	than	in	2007;	only	in	
Tasmania	was	it	lower.		An	exit	poll	suggested	that	a	third	of	those	who	voted	
Green	in	2010	would	have	voted	Labor	but	for	Labor’s	abandonment	of	
emissions	trading	(Rootes	2011,	p.	413);	in	2013,	with	Labor	committed	to	an	
ETS,	those	voters	might	simply	have	returned	to	Labor	in	its	hour	of	need.	Thus	
the	2010	result	may	be	an	anomaly	in	the	longer-term	trend	of	steadily	rising	
Greens	support.		
	
The	Greens	remain	the	third	party	both	in	seats	won	and	share	of	the	vote,	but	
will	have	to	operate	with	greatly	reduced	resources.	Because	public	funding	of	
political	parties	is	proportionate	to	the	votes	they	secure	at	elections,	the	Greens’	
funding	falls	from	$7.1	million	in	2010	to	$5.4	million.	This	will	make	it	more	
difficult	for	the	Greens	to	defend	the	six	Senate	seats	–	one	in	every	original	state	
–	won	in	2010.	
	
																																																								
2	Asked	which	of	eleven	issues	would	be	important	to	the	way	they	voted,	
respondents	ranked	health,	the	economy	and	education	well	ahead	of	asylum	
seekers	(7th);	climate	change	ranked	11th.	(Newspoll	for	The	Australian,	
http://polling.newspoll.com.au.tmp.anchor.net.au/image_uploads/130803%20I
ssues.pdf	[accessed	31.10.2013]).	
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Greens	gained	votes	in	only	11	House	seats,	with	best	results	in	Melbourne	and	
two	neighbouring	seats.	They	lost	ground	in	inner	city	target	seats	outside	
Melbourne,	Little	suggests	that	the	party	will	soon	gain	further	House	seats			
	
One	of	several	senior	staff	who	resigned	after	the	election	cited	differences	with	
Milne	over	strategy.	Her	attempt	to	reach	beyond	the	Greens’	urban	bases	spread	
resources	thinly	with	negligible	results.	The		Greens’	direction	of	preferences	to	
parties	opposed	to	any	carbon	pricing	contributed	to	the	election	of	at	least	one	
Senator	radically	opposed	to	Greens’	environmental	policies	over	a	rival,	more	
sympathetic	candidate.	Nevertheless,	in	the	mandatory	post-election	leadership	
ballot,	Milne	was	re-elected	unopposed.	
	
	
The	environment	
	
Commentators	remarked	the	absence	of	the	environment	as	an	issue	during	the	
campaign	but,	in	the	final	week,	Abbott	declared	the	election	‘a	referendum	on	
the	carbon	tax’,	which	he	claimed	would	rise	from	$24.15	per	tonne	in	2013-14	
to	$350	a	tonne	by	2050	and	devastate	the	economy	without	reducing	Australia’s	
greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	emissions.	An	80%	cut	in	emissions	could	only	be	
achieved	by	purchasing	over	$3	billion	of	carbon	credits	from	abroad,	which,	
Abbott	declared,	would	be	‘by	far	the	biggest	wealth	transfer	from	Australians	to	
foreigners	that’s	ever	been	contemplated’,	ignoring	the	fact	that	international	
carbon	trading	is	designed	to	allow	nations	with	different	competitive	
advantages	to	collectively	reduce	carbon	emissions	at	least	cost!	
	
Abbott	reiterated	the	misleading	claim	that	the	carbon	price	is	simply	a	tax.	Yet	
the	carbon	pricing	scheme	appears	to	have	been	effective	in	reducing	emissions	
without	incurring	the	heavy	economic	burdens	the	coalition	alleged.	A	
transitional	scheme	that	involves	purchase	and	surrender	of	emission	permits	as	
a	step	toward	an	ETS,	its	burden	on	households	is	essentially	nil	because	they	
were	compensated	for	the	increased	costs	of	energy	even	as	polluters	were	given	
clear	price	signals	to	reduce	their	emissions.	The	politically	expedient	ETS	would	
have	started	with	a	much	lower	carbon	price	but,	linked	to	the	variable	pricing	of	
the	EU	ETS	scheme,	would	have	entailed	less	certainty	about	both	the	carbon	
price	and	its	effects.	
	
The	details	of	the	coalition’s	alternative	‘Direct	Action’	plan	remain	obscure,	but	
its	basic	thrust	is	that,	rather	than	depending	on	a	market	mechanism	to	
discourage	GHG	emissions,	government	will	pay	industry	and	farmers	to	reduce	
emissions	and	will	incentivise	installation	of	renewable	energy	infrastructure	
and	activities	such	as	tree	planting	designed	to	absorb	carbon.		
	
Aside	from	the	irony	that	a	Liberal	government	should	prefer	empowering	
bureaucrats	to	allocate	permits	and	incentives	to	relying	upon	a	more	efficient	
market	mechanism,	the	problem	for	the	coalition	is	that	few	informed	observers	
are	confident	that	Direct	Action	will	effectively	reduce	emissions	at	acceptable	
cost.	A	post-election	survey	of	35	prominent	economists	found	that	while	30	
favoured	the	existing	carbon	price	scheme,	only	two	believed	Direct	Action	was	
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the	better	way	to	reduce	Australia's	GHG	emissions.	Pre-election	reports	for	the	
Treasury,	the	Climate	Institute	and	WWF	all	concluded	that,	in	order	to	meet	the	
5%	emissions	reduction	target	by	2020,	Direct	Action	would	cost	far	more	than	
the	$3.2	billion	estimated	by	the	coalition,	and	possibly	as	much	as	$35	billion	
(Edis	2013).		
	
Abbott	also	promised	that	his	government	would!spend	only	as	much	as	it	had!
budgeted:	‘We	will	get	as	much	environmental	improvement,	as	much	emissions	
reduction	as	we	can	for	the	spending	that	we’ve	budgeted.!!The	implication	was	
clear:	if	critics’	predictions	that	it	will	cost	far	more	to	achieve	the	5%	GHG	
reduction	than	the	coalition	has	budgeted,	then	it	is	the	carbon	reduction	target	
that	will	be	sacrificed,	not	the	budget.	Yet	even	before	the	election,	the	coalition	
pruned	its	budget	for	Direct	Action	from	$3.2	billion	to	$2.88	billion,	chiefly	by	
reducing	funding	for	renewable	energy.	
	
	
Prospects	
	
A	former	colleague	suggested	that	Abbott	will	be	a	traditional,	socially	and	
economically	conservative	Prime	Minister,	rather	than	a	neo-liberal	radical	(The	
Age	9.9.13),	but	nothing	in	Abbott’s	declarations	before,	during	and	since	the	
election	suggests	that	he	will	be	conservative	with	regard	to	environmental	
protection.		
	
On	its	first	day	in	office,	the	Abbott	government	ordered	the	Clean	Energy	
Finance	Corporation	(CEFC)	to	cease	making	investments,	and	abolished	the	
Department	of	Climate	Change	and	the	independent	Climate	Commission,	
shifting	its	responsibilities	to	the	Department	of	Environment.	It	also	moved	to	
abolish	the	independent	Climate	Change	Authority	(CCA).	This	was	justified	on	
grounds	of	cost,	but	since	the	sums	so	saved	are	very	modest,	the	suspicion	is	
that	the	real	reasons	are	ideological.	Nevertheless,	the	significance	of	these	
changes	may	be	chiefly	symbolic.	The	bonfire	of	climate	institutions	may	not	
presage	the	abandonment	of	action	on	climate	change.	
	
Australia	remains	committed	to	its	obligations	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	and	to	
the	reduction	of	GHG	emissions	by	5%	by	2020.	Because	abolishing	the	CEFC	and	
the	CCA	requires	legislation	that	the	government	cannot	hope	to	pass	through	
the	Senate	before	July	2014,	both	will	continue	to	operate	in	the	interim.	The	
new	Environment	Minister,	Greg	Hunt,	despite	his	credibility-straining	defence	
of	Direct	Action	during	the	election	campaign,	has	since	declared	his	confidence	
that	there	will	be	effective	global	action	on	climate	change,	especially	because	of	
China's	growing	commitment.	Moreover,	Hunt,	a	longstanding	advocate	of	
abating	pollution	by	taxation,	appears	content	to	let	the	CCA	complete	its	review	
of	emissions	caps	and	targets,	which	is	expected	to	recommend	raising	
Australia’s	emissions	reduction	target	well	above	5%.		
Perhaps,	in	opposing	Labor’s	carbon	pricing	scheme	so	vehemently,	Abbott	
simply	opportunistically	wielded	the	stick	gifted	him	by	Labor’s	prevarication	
over	the	issue.		In	2009,	Abbott	described	himself	as	‘a	bit	of	a	weather	vane’	on	
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climate	change,	and	his	more	extravagant	utterances	during	the	campaign	may	
have	been	more	a	rhetorical	gesture	to	the	right	than	an	intimation	of	personal	
skepticism.	Certainly,	Abbott	asserted	both	during	and	after	the	election	that	
climate	change	is	real	and	that	strong	action	should	be	taken	against	it.	
There	are	signs	that	the	public	response	to	the	Abbott	government’s	manoeuvres	
may	not	be	passive:	in	less	than	a	week,	a	Facebook	campaign	raised	more	than	
$900,000	from	over	20,000	private	donors	to	fund	a	Climate	Council	to	replace	
the	now	abolished	Climate	Commission	and	to	fulfill	its	remit	of	providing	the	
public	with	apolitical	information	on	the	science	of	global	warming.	It	would	be	a	
nice	irony	if	the	government’s	attempt	to	bury	climate	change	in	the	depths	of	
the	bureaucracy	should	stimulate	the	public	mobilization	around	climate	change	
that	Australia	has	so	far	lacked.	
The	relationship	between	the	government	and	the	Climate	Council	looks	set	to	
be	conflictual.	When	Abbott	declared	that	claims	of	a	link	between	climate	
change	and	the	unprecedentedly	early	October	2013	bushfires	around	Sydney	
were	‘complete	hogwash’,	and	Hunt	supported	him	by	citing	Wikipedia	as	
authority	for	Abbott’s	proposition	that	bushfires	had	always	been	a	feature	of	
Australian	life,	the	Climate	Council's	Professor	Will	Steffen	expressed	frustration	
that	Abbott	and	Hunt	refused	to	accept	scientific	evidence	that	climate	change	
increases	the	probability	of	more	intense	fires	and	longer	fire	seasons.	
	
Even	if	the	changes	in	Australian	climate	policy	amount	to	less	than	the	
headlines	suggest,	in	other	respects	the	environment	remains	very	much	in	
question.	Even	as	Abbott’s	climate	policy	envisages	sequestering	carbon	by	
afforestation,	his	government	proposes	to	relax	constraints	upon	land-clearing,	
tear	up	the	Tasmanian	forests	agreement,	remove	World	Heritage	status	from	
significant	areas	of	Tasmanian	old-growth	forests	in	order	to	facilitate	the	
resumption	of	logging,	fast-track	approvals	of	new	infrastructure	and	resource	
extraction	developments,	and	switch	investment	from	public	transport	to	new,	
preferably	toll-free,	roads.		
	
Abbott	may	draw	back	from	some	of	these	controversial	measures.		He	may,	for	
example,	be	persuaded	by	warnings	from	the	Tasmanian	forestry	industry	that	
to	scrap	the	forests	agreement	could	actually	set	the	industry	back,	because	it	
would	threaten	FSC	(Forest	Stewardship	Council)	certification	and	make	
Australian	forest	products	unexportable	to	the	most	profitable	markets.		
	
Abbott	has	declared	that	he	has	a	mandate	to	repeal	the	carbon	tax	and	will	
brook	no	opposition,	but	any	attempt	to	bully	a	Senate	he	does	not	control	may	
backfire.	Until	the	new	Senators	take	their	seats	in	July	2014,	Abbott	will	face	in	
the	Senate	a	Labor	–	Greens	majority	committed	to	an	ETS.	Abbott	will	also	lack	a	
majority	in	the	new	Senate,	and	his	ability	to	repeal	carbon	pricing	will	depend	
on	negotiations	with	Senators	representing	micro-parties.	However,	since	all	but	
one	of	them	oppose	carbon	pricing,	it	is	unlikely	to	survive.	The	focus	will	then	
be	on	Direct	Action.	
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